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EMPLOYMENT
During the survey period, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals con-
sidered a number of cases in the area of employment.' This survey discusses
developments in the law of workers' compensation, unemployment compensation,
and public employment. In the area of workers' compensation, the court established
guidelines concerning the examination and evaluation of claimants prior to eviden-
tiary hearings. The court also reviewed cases concerning the dismissal of a claim
by way of a notice letter, dependent benefits in occupational pneumoconiosis claims,
the extent of coverage of an employee injured out of state, the right of an employer
to recover compensation benefits from a negligent third party, and the protection
accorded an injured employee who is terminated pursuant to provisions of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.
In the area of unemployment compensation, the court reviewed cases involving
a recent statutory amendment expanding the potential eligibility of individuals, notice
rights of employees aggrieved by a decision concerning compensation benefits, and
the permanent disqualification of an employee discharged for "gross misconduct"
from receiving benefits.
In the area of public employment, the court considered cases concerning the
classification of state employees and their rights to retroactive pay after reclassifica-
tion, the distinction between "public officials" and "public employees" for removal
purposes, and the constitutionality of a "no solicitation" policy.
I. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Medical Examinations
Brogan v. Workers' Compensation Commissioner, 327 S.E.2d 694 (W. Va. 1984).
In its most significant decision concerning employment during the survey period,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared that certain current practices
in the processing of workers' compensation claims were "[in]consistent with the
legislature's declared policy that the rights of claimants be determined as speedily
and expeditiously as possible." '2 Under the court's holding in Brogan v. Workers'
Compensation Commissioner,3 a claimant and employer have the right to select
one physician each to examine and evaluate the claimant, in addition to a neutral
physician selected by the Commissioner." The court also held that claimants and
employers are required to exchange all medical reports and submit them to the
' For additional developments in the field of employment law, see the Discriminatory Discharge
Subsection under Administrative Law in this survey.
' Brogan v. Worker's Compensation Comm'r, 327 S.E.2d 694, 699 (citing Workman v. State
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 656, 657, 236 S.E.2d 236, 237 (1977)).
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Commissioner without waiting for an evidentiary hearing.' Finally, the court found
that in the event an evidentiary hearing is necessary, a physician's presence at the
hearing is not required for the medical report to be admissible.'
The facts of this case are illustrative of the current system of processing workers'
compensation claims. Zeffie Brogan sustained a knee injury duriig the course of
employment. After Brogan returned to work, the Workers' Compensation Com-
missioner referred him to a neutral physician and, based on the physician's find-
ings, granted Brogan a twenty percent permanent partial disability award. The
employer protested this award and arranged for Brogan to be examined by their
physician, who estimated disability at ten percent.
7
The employer was then granted authorization by the Commissioner to have
Brogan examined by another physician, who suggested an award of no more than
five percent. The employer introduced both medical reports at the evidentiary hear-
ing, and Brogan's counsel was granted a continuance in order to review the
employer's medical evidence and to determine whether to cross-examine either doc-
tor or offer rebuttal medical evidence.'
At the next hearing, the employer moved to introduce a third physician's report.
Brogan's counsel objected, claiming that his client lacked the financial ability to
"match the employer report for report." 9 The Commissioner denied Brogan's motion
to strike the third medical report, reduced Brogan's disability award to fifteen per-
cent, and declared that all payments above fifteen percent were subject to recovery.
The Appeal Board affirmed this decision."
By the time the Commissioner reduced the award to fifteen percent, two and
one half years had elapsed since the initial award, and over four years had elapsed
since the injury. The Commissioner had set five dates for evidentiary hearings.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the Commissioner's decision and
reinstated the twenty percent award. Justice Harshbarger's majority opinion declared
that the actions of the employer and the Commissioner did not comport with the
legislative intent of workers' compensation laws, and promulgated three distinct
changes in the procedure.
First, West Virginia Code section 23-4-8 grants the Commissioner authority
to order a claimant "to appear for examination before a medical examiner or ex-
aminers selected by the Commissioner; and the claimant and employer, respectively,
shall each have the right to select a physician of his or its own choosing . . . to
Id.
Id. at 700.
' Id. at 696-97.
, Id. at 697.
9Id.
,o Id. at 698.
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participate in this examination."" Justice Harshbarger concluded that this section
"was intended to grant ... one-but only one-. . . physician to examine and
evaluate a claimant . .. ." The practice, as illustrated in this case, was for the
parties to seek out either "conservative" or "liberal" physicians for disability opin-
ions, with each side trying to accumulate more favorable medical reports than the
other side.' 3
Second, Justice Harshbarger reasoned that, given its proclaimed purpose of
a "speedy and expeditious determination of the claimant's rights," section 23-4-8
"must require claimants and employers to promptly exchange all medical reports
and submit them directly to the Commissioner without waiting for an evidentiary
hearing."' The practice of offering medical reports only at hearings resulted in
continuances granted to the opposing party so it could review the report and deter-
mine whether to cross-examine the physician. Such continuances needlessly extended
the time taken to determine the claimant's rights.
By requiring the parties to submit medical reports to the Commissioner before
the hearing, the court acknowledged the Commissioner's statutory authority to
"make, refuse, or modify awards based upon credible evidence supplied by the
parties and through independent medical evaluations, without advance evidentiary
hearings .... "" Such authority was designed to determine the validity of a claim
as quickly as possible.
To the extent that the Commissioner may make a determination based solely
on written reports of medical experts, the Brogan holding overruled Hoff v. State
Workers' Compensation Commissioner.'6 In Hoff, the court prohibited the mak-
ing of an award based solely upon the report prepared by the Commissioner's ex-
aminer. The court in Brogan clearly stated that the Commissioner may indeed make
an award based solely on such a report.
Justice Harshbarger recognized, however, that because the Commissioner has
a statutory duty to conduct a hearing within thirty days after an objection to the
award,' 7 medical examinations and evaluations are seldom exchanged within the
time period. Although necessary delays in obtaining reports constitute good cause
for continuance, Justice Harshbarger's desire for more realistic rules was quite clear.
In order for current practice to be consistent with legislative design, the time period
should be lengthened to allow for the practical difficulties of obtaining, exchang-
ing, and submitting medical reports and evaluations.
Id. (emphasis added). See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-8 (1985).




,6 Hoff v. State Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 148 W. Va. 33, 132 S.E.2d 772 (1963).
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Justice Harshbarger's third change in procedures provided that "nothing in
the statute, the administrative rules and regulations, or our decisions requires a
physician's presence at an evidentiary hearing for his report to be received in
evidence."' Although contrary to the general rules of evidence, this practice is
consistent with the mandate of West Virginia Code section 23-1-15 that "[tihe Com-
missioner shall not be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence
... and may make investigations in such manner as in his judgment is best calculated
to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out the provisions
of this chapter."' 9
The changes in procedures as promulgated by the court comport with the
legislative intent in workers' compensation statutes. The new standards not only
contribute to a more expeditious determination of a claimant's rights, but also
eliminate such financial overmatch as appeared in Brogan.
B. Dismissal of Claims
Adkins v. Workers' Compensation Commissioner, 330 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1985).
Inc., 330 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1985).
Recently the court addressed the issue of whether a claimant who has properly
furnished medical evidence and has been awarded a series of benefits may be deprived
of such benefits because of a failure to respond to a notice letter. The court's deci-
sion in Adkins v. Workers' Compensation Commissioner,"° reversed the Commis-
sioner's decision to deny benefits in such a situation.
The employee, Jay Adkins, filed a claim for a knee injury, to which the employer
made a timely protest. The employee's physician was subpoenaed by the Commis-
sioner to attend the protest hearing. At the conclusion of this hearing, the employer's
attorney moved for another hearing for further medical testimony and requested
notice to be sent to the employee advising him to appear at the hearing for cross-
examination. The notice did not advise the employee of any penalty in the event
he failed to attend the hearing."
When the employee did not attend the hearing, the Commissioner sent an in-
formal letter informing him that he had fifteen days to show good cause why he
did not appear.22 The letter indicated that, if the employee failed to respond or
show good cause why he did not appear, his claim would be dismissed. When the
employee failed to respond within fifteen days, the Commissioner not only dismissed
Brogan, 327 S.E.2d at 700.
Id. See W. VA. CODE § 23-1-15 (1985).
20 Adkins v. Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 330 S.E.2d 329 (W. Va. 1985).
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the claim, but also declared that all disability benefits paid to the employee should
be recovered. The Appeal Board affirmed the decision.
In reversing the Commissioner's decision, the court determined that its holding
in Butcher v. State Workers' Compensation Commissioner" was controlling: "Where
a claimant has properly furnished medical evidence and has been awarded a series
of temporary total disability benefits, the claimant may not be deprived of these
benefits by the Commissioner because he failed to respond to the fifteen-day notice
letters .. "I" Justice Miller's opinion in Adkins reasoned that workers' compen-
sation hearings, unlike other administrative hearings, are devoid of regulations con-
trolling the evidentiary development of a case at hearings. 2 Indeed, even the Com-
missioner's brief in the case explained that such hearings are conducted piecemeal,
with many claims being litigated for several years. "As a result," the Commis-
sioner's brief conceded, "it is not unusual for the parties and/or a witness to fail
to attend a hearing at some point in the litigation." '2 6
The court's holding in Adkins expanded the applicability of its Butcher deci-
sion. The employer had argued, and the Appeal Board agreed, that Butcher was
inapplicable because, in that case, the employer had failed to make a timely protest
and thus could not challenge the compensability of the claim. Where the employer
in Butcher was not entitled to cross-examine the claimant, the employer in Adkins,
by making a timely protest, had preserved the right to cross-examine.
Yet, Justice Miller reasoned that "the issue in the present case is not that the
employer should be denied a right to cross-examine the claimant, but rather under
what circumstances the employee's claim can be dismissed when he fails to appear
for cross-examination."" Even when the employer has made a timely protest, pre-
serving the right to challenge the compensability of the claim and activating the
employee's duty to be present at the hearing, the claim cannot be dismissed for
failure to respond to a fifteen-day notice letter.
Justice Miller noted, however, that the Commissioner is vested with subpoena
power and may utilize the subpoena to compel an employee or physician to attend
a hearing. Under West Virginia Code section 23-1-9, if an individual fails or refuses
to comply with the Commissioner's subpoena, "the circuit judge ... shall compel
obedience by attachment proceedings .. ."I The court left open the question of
whether, upon failure to comply with the subpoena, the employee's claim may also
be dismissed.
11 Butcher v. State Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 315 S.E.2d 563 (W. Va. 1983).
11 Id. at 565.
11 Adkins, 330 S.E.2d at 332.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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C. Dependent Benefits
Parker v. Workers' Compensation Commissioner, 324 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va. 1984).
Corp., 324 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va. 1984).
In the complex field of occupational pneumoconiosis, a claimant who meets
"exposure requirements" is referred to the Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board
for proper medical evaluation.2 9 The authority of the Workers' Compensation Com-
missioner in such cases is limited to determining whether the claimant meets the
non-medical exposure requirements. 31 In Parker v. Workers' Compensation Com-
missioner,3' the court clarified this procedure and found that a dependent, as well
as a living claimant, is entitled to the Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board's
evaluation.
Sharon Parker filed an application for dependent's benefits, alleging that her
husband's death was due to occupational pneumoconiosis. An autopsy report with
a diagnosis consistent with the claim was also submitted. The Commissioner re-
jected the application on the ground that no prima facie showing had been made
that the employee's death was due to occupational pneumoconiosis.3 2
In so ruling, the Commissioner had ignored the standard for evaluating
occupational pneumoconiosis claims, as articulated in Godfrey v. State Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner.33 In Godfrey, the court held that, when an occupa-
tional pneumoconiosis claim is filed, the Commissioner's statutory duty is to make
a non-medical period of exposure determination. 4 "Then, if the claimant meets
the exposure requirements, the Commissioner is required to refer the claim to the
Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board for medical evaluation."' 5
The employer attempted to distinguish Godfrey from this case by indicating
that Godfrey involved a living claimant while Parker involved a claim of the depen-
dent of the deceased. The court was unable to find any provision or rationale
in Workers' Compensation law that would justify treating a dependent's claim dif-
ferently than the claim of an employee. The purpose of Workers' Compensation
laws, the court found, necessitated that a dependent, as well as a living claimant,
be allowed the benefit of the Board's expertise in this complex field.3 6
Indeed, the court could not find anything in the relevant statutes that would
empower a Commissioner, under any circumstances, to make medical determina-
11 Parker v. Worker's Compensation Comm'r, 324 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1984). See W. VA. CODE
§ 23-4-8C (1985).
10 Id. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-15B (1985).
Parker, 324 S.E.2d 142.
, Id. at 143.
" Godfrey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 276 S.E.2d 802 (W. Va. 1981).
3, Parker, 324 S.E.2d at 144. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-15B (1985).
Godfrey, 276 S.E.2d at 803.
36 Parker, 324 S.E.2d at 144.
1985]
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tions on an initial application without medical advice from the Occupational
Pneumoconiosis Board.37 The finding of the Appeal Board was, therefore, reversed.
D. Coverage of Employees Injured Out of State
Fausnet v. State Workers' Compensation Commissioner, 327 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va.
1985).
In Fausnet v. State Workers' Compensation Commissioner,38 the court addressed
the question of whether an employee .may receive workers' compensation benefits
in West Virginia when he or she was injured in another state. The court ruled that
such an employee is entitled to seek benefits in West Virginia if "the employee's
employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature. . .. -39 The
court, however, stopped short of setting a standard for determining temporary or
transitory employment.
Bernard Fausnet, a resident of North Carolina, was hired in West Virginia
by Appalachian Drilling Co. in January, 1978. In May, 1978, after working on
two job sites in West Virginia, the employee was sent to work on a project in Ohio,
where he sustained a back injury. He subsequently left the job with Appalachian
and returned to North Carolina. He later filed this claim for benefits in West
Virginia.
The Commissioner rejected the application, determining that Fausnet "was not
an employee subject to coverage" under West Virginia's workers' compensation
laws. 0 The Appeal Board affirmed, concluding that the employee's Ohio employ-
ment, although expected to last only two months, was not temporary in nature
thus excluding Fausnet from coverage under West Virginia Code section 23-2-1.11
It reasoned that, "although the claimant might have stayed with the company after
that job was finished, it is not certain that his next job would have been located
in the State of West Virginia. ' ' 2
In reversing the Commissioner's decision, the court determined that there was
sufficient contact between the employer and the State of West Virginia, and that
the employee's Ohio employment was temporary in nature. Although West Virginia
statutes focus upon the question of whether an injured employee's employment
" The court in Godfrey invalidated section 20.03 of the Workers' Compensation Administrative
regulations which empowered the Commissioner to dismiss occupational pneumoconiosis claims "if
the medical evidence in the initial application fails to diagnose occupational pneumoconiosis.
" Fausnet v. State Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 327 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1985).
Id. at 474.
4o Id. at 471. The Commissioner had originally held the claim to be compensable. Fausnet received
benefits for the period of May 18, 1978 to June 3, 1978.
" Id. See W. VA. CODE § 23-2-1 (1985).
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in another state was temporary or transitory in nature, Justice McHugh's opinion
seemed to place great emphasis on the fact that the employee was actually hired
in West Virginia. "We are of the opinion that the hiring of an employee in West
Virginia is a factor to be considered concerning the question of whether that
employee's work in a foreign state is, in fact, temporary or transitory.""3
In reaching its decision, the court also indicated that the employee had worked
at two job sites in West Virginia and that there was no evidence that he would
be permanently located in Ohio. Also, the fact that the employer maintained an
office in Charleston further demonstrated the employee's contact with the State.
Because of the subjective nature of the court's decision, the evaluation of
workers' compensation claims must proceed on a case by case basis. Although the
court's holding in Fausnet helps to clarify the relevant statutes and their applicability
to similar cases, the court failed to indicate which factors were accorded greater
weight in the decision, or whether other circumstances could be included in the
determination. For example, how would the court view a situation in which an
employee was hired in West Virginia but the Ohio project was his first assignment?
It is clear that a "grey area" remains in the circumstance where a worker seeking
benefits was injured in another state.
E. Third Party Negligence
National Fruit Product Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 329 S.E.2d
125 (W. Va. 1985).
West Virginia is one of only three states that does not give the right of subroga-
tion, by statute, to recover Workers' Compensation benefits paid to employees in-
jured by third party negligence. Such "subrogation statutes" typically diminish the
amount an injured employee recovers in a separate action against a negligent third
party by the amount of workers' compensation benefits the employee receives. The
absence of a subrogation statute in West Virginia was critical in the court's deci-
sion in National Fruit Product Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co." In this
case, National Fruit alleged that two of its employees were injured when the door
of a boxcar, owned by the defendant, fell on them as they were preparing to load
the car. Because National Fruit was required to make increased payments into the
Workers' Compensation Fund to cover the benefits received by the employees, it
argued that it was entitled to recover this increase from the defendant. Recognizing
that West Virginia does not have a subrogation statute, National Fruit claimed
its right to recover the increase under the theories of implied indemnity and loss
of employee services.
' Id. at 474.
" National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 329 S.E.2d 125 (W. Va. 1985).
1985]
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The court affirmed the circuit court's decision that National Fruit's action could
not be maintained. Specifically, the court stated that, for the employer to have
a cause of action for indemnity, "there must be a common or coextensive obliga-
tion existing between the employer and the negligent third party." ' Because the
employer's obligation to the employee arose from the workers' compensation laws,
in which the employee's injury need not arise from negligence, its cause of action
under the theory of implied indemnity failed.
The employer's second cause of action-that the third party was liable for the
loss of services of the two employees-was also dismissed. The rule in West Virginia,
as articulated in Nemo Foundations v. New River Co.,46 is that the employer may
maintain an action against a third party for the loss of services of its employees
only when the third party intentionally injured the employees. Because National
Fruit claimed that the defendant negligently injured the employees, the court con-
cluded that no cause of action existed.
Under a typical subrogation statute, National Fruit would have been able to
recoup its compensation benefits from any award obtained against the negligent
third party. Consequently, its cause of action for indemnity or loss of employee
services would have been unnecessary. For this reason, National Fruit argued that
the court should judicially recognize a cause of action for an employer against a
negligent third party to recover compensation benefits. The court refused to do
this, however, stating that because the workers' compensation system in West
Virginia is statutorily based, judicial intrusion is unwarranted."' The court recognized
that the rights and obligations of employers, employees, and third parties are so
intertwined and complex that "this area of law is best addressed by the Legislature
through the passage of detailed subrogation statutes." 48
Although the court refused to intervene in this area of law, its message to the
Legislature was quite clear, "[o]ur legislature has not acted, although it must be
aware from our cases that we are one of three states that does not accord a statutory
subogation right in our Workers' Compensation Act." 4 9
F. Collective Bargaining Agreements
Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1985).
Recently, the court addressed the question of what protection should be accorded
an injured employee who is terminated pursuant to the provisions of a collective
41 Id. at 129.
6 Nemo Foundations, Inc. v. New River Co., 155 W. Va. 149, 181 S.E.2d 687 (1971).
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bargaining agreement because of her unavailability for work. The court's holding
in Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc." offers little protection to the individual in such
a situation.
The appellant, Elizabeth Yoho, was employed by Triangle as a utility laborer
when she accidentally spilled acid on herself, resulting in second and third degree
burns over thirty-five percent of her body.' The Workers' Compensation Com-
missioner awarded her temporary total disability benefits.2 A year after the acci-
dent, the appellant's employment with Triangle was terminated pursuant to the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. 3 The reason for her termination
was based upon her unavailability for work over the preceding twelve-month period
due to her injury.
The appellant's original complaint alleged three grounds for relief: that she
was the victim of retaliatory discharge, that the contractual provision under which
she was discharged violated West Virginia public policy, and that Triangle's action
in discharging her constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress.,' She
later moved to amend the complaint, eliminating references to the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The circuit court denied the motion to amend, and then granted
the appellee's motion to dismiss."
The supreme court held that the circuit court's denial of the appellant's mo-
tion to amend was in error because "the theories of recovery and the facts relied
upon remained essentially the same." 56 Since the West Virginia Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provide that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires," 57
and because the changes were minor, the court had difficulty seeing how the ap-
pellee would have been prejudiced by the amendment.
The court also found that the trial court erred in dismissing the claim based
on a preemption of federal law.5 8 The lower court presumably based its decision
on the United States Supreme Court decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck' 9
which stated, "when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon
analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties in a labor contract,
that claim must either be treated as a section 301 claim6" ... or dismissed as preemp-
'0 Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1985).
I d. at 206.
'2 Elizabeth also received a substantial settlement in a Mandolidis action against Triangle.
" Article IV of the agreement provides that continuous service, which defines seniority, shall
be broken by "layoff for lack of work or other reason for a continuous period in excess of one (1)
year for employees with less than five (5) years seniority at the time of such layoff." Id. at 207 n.3.
Yoho, 336 S.E.2d at 206.
" Id.
56 Id. at 207.
" W. VA. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
* Yoho, 336 S.E.2d at 208.
19 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
60 National Labor Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
19851
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ted by federal labor-contract law." 6' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
found that the appellant's claim was not substantially dependent on analysis of
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and therefore should not have
been dismissed because of preemption of federal law.6"
After declaring that the appellant's amended complaint should have been
allowed, the court proceeded to find all three causes of action groundless. The
court held that the appellant's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
should have been dismissed because such action, under the rule set out in Harless
v. First National Bank of Fairmont,63 required extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causing severe emotional distress.64 Because Triangle was
merely following the mandate of the collective bargaining agreement when it fired
the appellant, the court concluded that this was not extreme or outrageous conduct.6
The appellant also alleged that Triangle discriminated against her because she
received worker's compensation benefits after Triangle discharged her. 66 The court
found this claim to be meritless because under the facially neutral provision of
the agreement, the appellant would have been terminated just as quickly if she
had never applied for workers' compensation benefits.67
The court's dismissal of the appellant's third cause of action, that the contract
provision under which she was terminated violated public policy, is the most
troubling. The appellant had suffered a physically and emotionally painful injury
which caused her to be off work for twelve months. She was then dismissed from
her job because of a collective bargaining agreement. Although the court declared
its sympathy for her plight, it stated that the power to declare an action against
public policy is difficult to define 8 and that "an issue which is fairly debatable
or controversial in nature is one for the legislature and not for this Court." 69
The "debatable or controversial nature" of the issue, the court reasoned, was
the competitive nature of seniority. "While this Court has consistently fought to
aid the injured employee, we will not go so far as to give an advantage to the
injured employee over the other employees." 0 Obviously, the union and Triangle
had agreed that the employee who stayed on the job longer was more worthy of
11 Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1916.
62 Yoho, 336 S.E.2d at 208.
6" Harless v. First National Bank of Fairmont, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982).
14 Id. at syllabus point 6.
68 Yoho, 336 S.E.2d at 209.
" W. VA. CODE § 23-5A-1 (1985) provides: "No employer shall discriminate in any manner against
any of his present or former employees because of such present or former employee's receipt of or
attempt to receive [workers' compensation benefits]."
67 Yoho, 336 S.E.2d at 210.
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promotion and job security than an employee who had been off the job for a
substantial period of time, even if that employee had been injured.
II. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Butler v. Rutledge, 329 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1985).
Mizell v. Rutledge, 328 S.E.2d 514 (W. Va. 1985).
Federoff v. Rutledge, 332 S.E.2d 855 (W. Va. 1985).
In deciding three unemployment compensation cases during the survey period,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was guided by the principle that
unemployment compensation statutes, being remedial in nature, should be liberally
construed to achieve their benign purposes." In the first case, Butler v. Rutledge,72
the court determined that a recent statutory amendment expanded the potential
eligibility of individuals for unemployment compensation benefits.
The Butler case was a consolidation of several actions, each involving an in-
dividual who left his original employment (in which he had worked for at least
thirty days) to take another job. In each case the individual was subsequently laid
off from that job prior to working thirty work days. By looking only at the
employees' original employment, the Department of Employment Security deter-
mined that they had left that employment voluntarily, therefore disqualifying the
petitioners indefinitely from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.73 The
circuit court affirmed, holding that the employees were disqualified under West
Virginia Code section 21A-6-3(1). 74
In so ruling, the circuit court apparently overlooked the 1981 amendment to
the statute which deleted the definition of "work" from the relevant section. The
deleted section defined "work" as "employment with the last employing unit with
whom such individual was employed as much as 30 days. . ."'I Under this statute,
an individual must be involuntarily dismissed from a job he or she has held for
at least thirty working days to be eligible for benefits.
In reversing the lower court's decision, the court held that by deleting the defini-
tion of "work" from the statute in the 1984 amendment, the Legislature intended
to grant eligibility to individuals who have involuntarily left employment, even if
that employment lasted less than thirty days.", The court relied upon its reasoning
" See Davis v. Hix, 140 W. Va. 398, 84 S.E.2d 404 (1954).
,2 Butler v. Rutledge, 329 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1985).
" Id. at 121. The West Virginia Unemployment Compensation Act is designed to compensate
individuals who are involuntarily unemployed. See Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 291 S.E.2d 477, 482
(W. Va. 1982).
" Id.
" W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(a) (1978) (amended 1981).
,6 Butler, 329 S.E.2d at 124.
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in Hall v. Baylous: "The Legislature must be presumed to know the language
employed in former acts, and, if in a subsequent statute on the same subject it
uses different language in the same connection, the court must presume that a change
in the law was intended.""' The court reasoned that a sentence of such importance
does not disappear from a statute without intention.
However, the court further determined that, once an individual is determined
to be disqualified from receiving benefits (i.e., if the individual left his or her most
recent work voluntarily and applied for benefits at that time), that disqualification
continues "until the individual returns to covered employment and has been
employed in covered employment at least 30 working days." ' , Therefore, if the
individuals in this case had applied for benefits after they had been disqualified
under West Virginia Code section 21A-6-3(1), their disqualification would have con-
tinued even after they were laid off from the later jobs, because those jobs did
not continue for the required thirty working days.
The court's propensity to construe unemployment compensation statutes in favor
of claimants was also evident in its decision in Mizell v. Rutledge." Also a con-
solidation of actions, Mizell involved the issue of notice rights of claimants,
employers, and other interested parties who have been aggrieved by a decision con-
cerning unemployment compensation benefits.
The claimants in Mizell were discharged from their respective employments for
alleged misconduct. Upon filing claims for unemployment compensation benefits,
they were temporarily disqualified from receiving such benefits due to their discharges
for alleged misconduct. None of the claimants appealed the Deputy Commissioner's
decisions, primarily for reasons of convenience and economics. Upon expiration
of the disqualification period, each claimant began receiving regular benefits.
Upon exhaustion of their regular benefits, the claimants applied for extended
benefits. They were declared ineligible for extended benefits because of their previous
disqualifications for misconduct, pursuant to West Virginia Code section
21A-6A-l(12)(G)Y' Each claimant appealed, but the decisions were affirmed by
the circuit court.
The claimants argued that if they had been informed that the Commissioner's
decision to disqualify them for regular benefits would later render them ineligible
to receive extended benefits, they would have contested the decisions on appeal.
The Department of Employment Security conceded that the notices sent to the
" Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 153 S.E. 293, Syllabus Point 2 (W. Va. 1930).
" Butler, 329 S.E.2d at 125.
79 Mizell v. Rutledge, 328 S.E.2d 514 (W. Va. 1985).
W. VA. CODE § 21A-6A-1(12)(G) (1985) provides in relevant part:
An individual shall not be eligible to receive extended benefits with respect to any week of
unemployment in his eligibility period if such individual has been disqualified for regular
benefits under this chapter because he or she voluntarily left work, was discharged for miscon-
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claimants did not inform them that they would be ineligible for extended benefits
in the future.'
The court reversed the circuit court's decision and declared the claimants eligible
for extended benefits holding that the Deputy Commissioner's failure to inform
the claimants that their disqualifications could render them ineligible for extended
benefits violated the notice requirements of West Virginia Code section 21A-7-8.82
Under this section, an individual aggrieved by a decision of a Deputy Commis-
sioner is entitled "to a fair hearing and reasonable opportunity to be heard before
an appeal tribunal .. ."83 Thus, such a governmental action is certainly not fair
when the claimant has not been informed of the consequences of the disqualifica-
tion needed to make an informed decision concerning appeal.
It should be noted that the court's liberal interpretation of the notice require-
ment will not always result in a favorable decision for the claimant. In the case
of Ottenheimer Publishers,8 4 cited by the court, a discharged employee was dis-
qualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits because she had
refused available work. The notice sent to the employer did not inform him that
the disqualification was temporary. When the claimant later began to receive benefits,
the employer protested. Holding that the notice violated the relevant statute because
it failed to "fully inform" the employer, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted
the employer an opportunity to appeal the original decision.85 Ottenheimer illustrates
the point that notice requirements must be adhered to across the board to allow
claimants, employers, and other interested parties the information necessary to make
informed decisions.
As stated in Mizell, West Virginia Code section 21A-6-3 mandates a six-week
disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits if it is determined that
the claimant was discharged for ordinary misconduct. Section 21A-6-3 also pro-
vides that permanent disqualification results if the reason for discharge is "gross
misconduct. '8 6 In Federoff v. Rutledge," the court clarified the distinction in its
decision concerning an employee's discharge for alleged intoxication.
Sidney Federoff, a maintenance foreman at Maitland Mine with a reputation
for drinking and absentee problems, was orally warned by the superintendent that
coming to work drunk or smelling of alcohol would subject him to discharge. 8
1, Mizell, 328 S.E.2d at 517.
32 Id. at 518. See W. VA. CODE § 21A-7-8 (1985).
W . VA. CODE § 21A-7-8 (1985).
, Ottenheimer Publishers, Inc. v. Employment Security Admin., 275 Md. 514, 340 A.2d 701 (1975).
Id. at 519, 340 A.2d at 704.
6 W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3 (1985) provides that an employee discharged for actions constituting
"gross misconduct" "shall be and remain disqualified for benefits until he has thereafter worked for
at least 30 days in covered employment."




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 17
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/17
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
Federoff received his second warning one week later when he reported to work
with alcohol on his breath. Several months later Federoff reported for night shift
work approximately five hours late, again with alcohol on his breath. He was
discharged at this time, although he testified that he had a "couple of drinks"
at 7:00 p.m. and overslept the start of his 12:00 p.m. shift. 9
When Federoff applied for unemployment compensation benefits, the Deputy
Commissioner permanently disqualified him because his discharge for "reporting
to work in an intoxicated condition" constituted discharge for gross misconduct.90
The administrative law judge and the Board of Review affirmed the Deputy Com-
missioner's decision, yet neither indicated the specific statutory basis for their con-
clusion that Federoff was terminated for gross misconduct.
The court reversed the decision and reduced the disqualification period to six
months. It held that the decision should be reversed whether the previous deter-
mination was based on Federoff's alleged intoxication on the job, or on his having
the smell of alcohol on his breath.
The majority opinion, penned by Justice McGraw, stated that, if the lower
court's decision was based on the employee having alcohol on his breath after being
warned, then the ruling was incorrect because section 21A-6-3 states that such
"gross" misconduct occurs only when the individual has received prior written warn-
ing.9 ' Federoff received only oral warnings.
Likewise, the court found that in the context of unemployment compensation
proceedings, evidence of "drinker's breath" alone is insufficient to support a finding
of intoxication. 2 The supervisor testified only to the smell of alcohol and he later
testified that Federoff's walk and speech appeared normal.93 Although the court
did not specify what type of evidence would be sufficient to prove an employee's
intoxication, it clearly believed that the smell of alcohol, by itself, was insufficient.
The remainder of Justice McGraw's opinion dealt with the economic and social
problem of alcohol in the workplace. Although stating that "the afflicted employee
must assume the responsibility of dealing with this problem," ' 94 Justice McGraw
articulated several possible affirmative steps that employers could take to encourage
treatment and rehabilitation, including:
(I) education of supervisory personnel on detecting affected employees; (2) institu-
tion of progressive discipline programs which motivate employees to seek treat-
ment to avoid further discipline or discharge; (3) in-house education or counseling
" Id. at 857.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 859. See W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3 (Supp. 1984).
92 Id. at 859, see also 4 R. GRAY & L. GORDY, ATTORNEY's TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, § 133.10
(3rd ed. -1985).
9' Federoff, 332 S.E.2d at 859.
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programs by large employers; (4) systematic procedures for referral to locally
available rehabilitative programs offered by Alcoholics Anonymous and community
mental health centers; and (5) "opting in" for statutorily required offerings of
coverage of treatment for alcoholism by insurance plans."
III. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. Civil Service
Commission. 324 S.E.2d 363 (W. Va. 1984).
Mullins v. Kiser, 331 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1985).
West Virginia University Association of Concerned Employees v. Saunders, No.
161-85, slip op. (W. Va. July 1, 1985).
During the survey period, the court considered cases concerning the classifica-
tion of state employees, the distinction between "public officials" and "public
employees" for removal purposes, and the constitutionality of a "no solicitation"
policy.
In the first case, AFSCME v. Civil Service Commission,96 the court addressed
the issue of whether retroactive pay was appropriate after the Commission had
reclassified employees who were performing duties outside of their classification.
Such classifications, as determined by the Department of Human Services, must
adhere to the principle "equal pay for equal work," as reflected in West Virginia
Code section 29-6-10.97
In AFSCME, the Department of Human Services had divided Economic Ser-
vice Workers into three classifications, with Economic Service Worker III receiving
the highest salary. The petitioners were classified as Economic Service Workers
I and II, and they alleged that, because they were performing the same duties as
an Economic Service Worker III, they were entitled to that classification with
appropriate salary and retroactive pay.
After a study revealed that the petitioners were indeed performing the same
duties as required for Economic Service Worker III, the Commission modified the
classifications, eliminating the Economic Service Worker III, and differentiating
between the I and II classifications by the "level of difficulty of the duties per-
" Id.
" AFSCME v. Civil Service Commission of West Virginia, 324 S.E.2d 363 (W. Va. 1984).
" Id. at 367. See W. VA. CODE § 29-6-10 (1980) which provides in part:
Each employee shall be paid at one of the rates set forth in the pay plan for the class of
position in which he is employed. The principle of equal pay for equal work in the several
agencies of the state government shall be followed in the pay plan as established hereby.
1985]
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formed and responsibility assumed." ' However, even after this finding the Com-
mission denied the petitioners retroactive pay. 99
The court determined that the petitioners were entitled to the difference in com-
pensation between the Economic Service Worker I and II classifications and the
III classification.' 0 Chief Justice McHugh cited Theroux v. State,'0' in which cer-
tain California employees were arbitrarily excluded from a statutory salary adjust-
ment. In finding the employees were entitled to retroactive pay, the California court
in Theroux concluded: "During the period in question respondent's right to full
compensation for services rendered matured immediately upon their rendition,
regardless of the date the amount of such compensation was finally fixed."' 0 2
Likewise, the West Virginia court in AFSCME ruled that the petitioners were entitled
to retroactive pay for the entire period in which they were performing the same
duties as the Economic Service Worker III employees.' 0 3
The original classifications formulated by the Department were anomalous to
the principle of "equal pay for equal work" because they created three separate
pay scales for employees doing essentially the same work. To be consistent with
the court's decision, the Civil Service Commission must not only grant retroactive
pay to employees for the period in which they worked out of classification, but
also use precision and detail in the formation of such classification.
In the second public employment case decided in the survey period, the court
clarified the distinction between "public officials" and "public employees" for the
purpose of removal of an employee. In Mullins v. Kiser,'10 the court ruled that
a public school teacher was a public employee, and subject to the removal provi-
sions of West Virginia Code section 18A-2-8."
The West Virginia Code provisions concerning the removal of a public official
are separate and distinct from provisions concerning removal of a public employee.'0 6
Although the Code states these provisions clearly and succinctly, it does not define
exactly what constitutes a public official and a public employee. The distinction
between job titles therefore must be clarified judicially, as the court in Mullins
has done.
David Kiser was a tenured high school teacher whose removal was sought by
petitioners, residents of Lincoln County. The petitioners alleged that Kiser directed
five students to hold a learning disabled student captive for an afternoon.0 7 Peti-
90 AFSCME, 324 S.E.2d at 365.
99 Id.
110 Id. at 367.
,0, Theroux v. State, 152 Cal. App.3d 1, 199 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1984).
'02 Id. at 8, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 267-68.
o AFSCME, 324 S.E.2d at 367.
114 Mullins v. Kiser, 331 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1985).
W00 . VA. CODE § 18A-2-8 (1984).
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tioners filed suit in the circuit court to have Kiser removed under the provisions
of section 6-6-7, asserting that Kiser was a public official." 8
In holding that a teacher is a public employee and not a public official, the
court cited its own test articulated in Christopher v. City of Fairmont:
As a general rule it may be stated that a position is a public office when it is created
by law, with duties cast on the incumbent which involve an exercise of some por-
tion of the sovereign power and in the performance of which the public is con-
cerned, and which are continuing in their nature and not occasional or intermit-
tent. But one who merely performs the duties required of him by persons employ-
ing him under an express or implied contract, though such persons themselves be
public officers, and though the employment be in or about public work or business,
is a mere employee.' 9
A public school teacher's position is not created by law, nor does it exercise any
portion of sovereign power of the state. A teacher may perform duties under the
direction of public officials, but is not himself a public official.
The reason behind the petitioners' suit was the fear that the Code provisions
for the removal of public employees were ineffective. Specifically, they assert that
they had no recourse if the Board decided not to act, and that if the Board did
act, it must allow an "improvement period.""'
Justice Brotherton's opinion assuaged these fears by explaining that the Board
has a duty to act upon a citizen's complaint and may be compelled to do so by
appropriate legal action if its inaction is arbitrary."' Also, the "improvement period"
requirement applies only to correctable behavior and it does not prevent immediate
discharge in appropriate circumstances."2
The court's holding in Mullins reaffirmed the fact that the Christopher test
is determinative of whether an individual is a public official or a public employee.
Yet, the court correctly pointed out that the difference in the removal provisions
in the West Virginia Code do not create unfair barriers for the removal of a public
school teacher. A teacher may be dismissed on a complaint initiated by a citizen
outside the school system," 3 and the School Board has a legal duty to act upon
such complaints.'
'o' Id. at 494.
Christopher v. City of Fairmont, 280 S.E.2d 284, 285 (W. Va. 1981), quoting State ex rel.
Key v. Bond, 94 W. Va. 255, 260, 118 S.E. 276, 279 (1923).
Mullins, 331 S.E.2d at 496. See West Virginia Board of Education Policy No. 5300(6)(a).
Mullins, 333 S.E.2d at 496. See Mason Co. Board of Education v. State Superintendent of
Schools, 274 S.E.2d 435 (W. Va. 1981), and State ex rel. Withers v. Board of Education, 153 W.
Va. 867, 172 S.E.2d 796 (1970).
12 Mullins, 331 S.E.2d at 496.
Mason County, 274 S.E.2d at 439.
"4 In at least one way it is easier to bring an action to remove a public employee than a public
official. Note that five or more voters are needed to bring a complaint in W. VA. CODE § 6-6-7 (1979),
whereas a sole citizen may bring a complaint under W. VA. CODE § 18A-2-8 (1984).
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In the third public employment case, West Virginia University Association of
Concerned Employees v. Saunders,"' the court addressed the constitutionality of
a regulation promulgated by the Board of Regents. Because "public officials are
not free to promulgate clearly unconstitutional regulations impinging upon the first
amendment rights of thousands of State employees," the court found the Board's
"no solicitation" policy unconstitutionally broad." 6
The petitioners, who allegedly violated the "no solicitation" policy, sought a
writ of mandamus against the Board compelling modification of the policy." 7 The
Board, under court directions to show good cause why the petitioners' request should
not be awarded, modified the policy and moved to dismiss the petition as moot.
The modified policy provided, in relevant part, that, "[e]xcept to solicit participa-
tion in official University programs and activities, no University employee or other
person shall solicit organizational memberships during declared work time in working
areas of the University.""'
The court found that, although the modification ameliorated most of the
vagueness and overbreadth of the previous policy, it was still overly broad with
respect to its worktime and workplace prohibitions." 9 In particular, the court found
that the definition of "declared work time" as "the period from the commence-
ment of a work shift to the meal break and from the end of the meal break to
the end of the work shift"' 2 to be overly broad.
Because the stated goal of the policy was to maintain "continuous service, order
and discipline,"' 2 ' the policy should have exempted not only meal breaks but also
coffee breaks and other periods of the work day when work tasks were not being
performed.' 22 In order to accomodate the important constitutional interests involved,
the court declared that the "no solicitation" policy must be limited to "while work
tasks are being performed."' 23
Based on its findings, the court ordered the removal from the petitioners' per-
sonnel records of all references to their alleged violations of the policy. The court
also awarded the petitioners' attorney's fees payable from the general operating funds
of West Virginia University.'2 4
The court's decision is illustrative of the principle that regulations governing
the exercise of free speech rights must be both narrowly and clearly drawn.' 2 ,
"I West Virginia Univ. Ass'n of Concerned Employees v. Saunders, No. 161-85, slip op. (W.
Va. July 1, 1985).







"2 Id. at 2-3.
12" See Allen v. Human Rights Comm'n, 324 S.E.2d 99, 127 (W. Va. 1984).
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Although it infers that a correctly phrased "no solicitation" policy is a constitu-
tionally sound regulation of free speech rights which would ensure "continuous
service, order, and discipline," Board of Regents is indicative of the narrowness
to which such regulations must be drawn to pass constitutional muster.
Scott A. Lane
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